Monday, July 30, 2007
SOMETIMES WE DON'T SUCK
And, after a month of horrible play, we suddenly are able to sweep a good team. We've seen this team go through slumps before, what with the reliance on batting average and the lack of power. But when it all clicks, as it did over the weekend, it sure is pretty.
Speaking of average at the expense of power, there is much consternation amongst announcers over Vlad's home run slump. But over those 27 games, he's hitting 312/350/422, "good" for an OPS+ of 108. Yeah, it's far less than we expect from Vlad, but remember that last year he had a month where he hit .243, and in 2005 hit .224 and .208 in two separate months. If this is his "slump" for the year, I'm not complaining, especially one you realize that in those 27 games he's knocked 12 doubles, which over 162 games is a pace for 72. Turn six of those doubles into home runs (giving us a much more reasonable pace of 36 each), and his slugging percentage would go up to .532 over these games, and his OPS+ would be 135. He's going to be fine.
Incidentally (this whole post will be a string of incidental observations), have you noticed that Casey Kotchman got two hits against lefty pitching yesterday? I understand that Mike Scioscia wants to get Robb Quinlan's bat into the lineup against southpaws, but most recent minor league splits (I don't have any from before then) indicate that he doesn't really have a platoon split. Kotch has only 109 plate appearances against lefties in his major league career (less than 100 AB), so I would definitely say the jury's still out on whether or not he can hit them. I suspect that he can.
Anyway, we go into Seattle. I guess these games look big, but in my view this division is the Angel's to lose, and I'm not particularly concerned about the teams behind us. If we play the way we should, we should be okay. If we don't, and continue to be hacktastically inconsistent, it won't matter who is behind us: the fall will be on us.
Speaking of average at the expense of power, there is much consternation amongst announcers over Vlad's home run slump. But over those 27 games, he's hitting 312/350/422, "good" for an OPS+ of 108. Yeah, it's far less than we expect from Vlad, but remember that last year he had a month where he hit .243, and in 2005 hit .224 and .208 in two separate months. If this is his "slump" for the year, I'm not complaining, especially one you realize that in those 27 games he's knocked 12 doubles, which over 162 games is a pace for 72. Turn six of those doubles into home runs (giving us a much more reasonable pace of 36 each), and his slugging percentage would go up to .532 over these games, and his OPS+ would be 135. He's going to be fine.
Incidentally (this whole post will be a string of incidental observations), have you noticed that Casey Kotchman got two hits against lefty pitching yesterday? I understand that Mike Scioscia wants to get Robb Quinlan's bat into the lineup against southpaws, but most recent minor league splits (I don't have any from before then) indicate that he doesn't really have a platoon split. Kotch has only 109 plate appearances against lefties in his major league career (less than 100 AB), so I would definitely say the jury's still out on whether or not he can hit them. I suspect that he can.
Anyway, we go into Seattle. I guess these games look big, but in my view this division is the Angel's to lose, and I'm not particularly concerned about the teams behind us. If we play the way we should, we should be okay. If we don't, and continue to be hacktastically inconsistent, it won't matter who is behind us: the fall will be on us.
Labels: Casey Kotchman, hacktastic offense, Robb Quinlan, Vladimir Guerrero
Friday, July 27, 2007
BIG TEIX
Mike DiGiovanna and Ben Bolch:
Now, first of all, Mark Teixeira is an excellent hitter and superb defender. He almost certainly is an upgrade on Casey Kotchman right now (if for no other reason than he's not a platoon player). But how much would he help this team over the balance of the season?
Over his career (four-and-a-half seasons), I estimate Teixeira to be roughly +.035 runs per plate appearance better than the average hitter. The Angels currently use a platoon; in their careers, Kotch is +.005 for his career against RHP and Q is +.037 against LHP.
Now, this isn't entirely fair to Casey, as it includes his disease-plagued 2006 numbers, but, for the moment, let's assume that this represents his true talent level. There are 57 games from August 1 forward, and I think we can safely assume four plate appearances per game. That's 228 plate appearances left to go in the season from the first base spot. With 229 plate appearances, at his career levels, Mark Teixeira would give us around +8 runs above average.
That's right: a whole eight runs.
76% of the Angels' PA this year have come against right-handed pitching, so of the 228 remaining PA at 1B, 173 would go to Kotchman and 55 to Quinlan (Q could of course rack up some appearances at other positions). Based on their career rates, that would give us +1 run from Kotchman and +2 runs from Robb. So three total -- five less than Teixeira: half of a win.
Now, we're almost certainly underselling Kotchman here, possibly overselling Quinlan, and possibly underselling Big Tex. Kotch so far this year is +.045 vs. RHP, Q this year is -.006, and Teixeira overall is +.053. Over 228 PA, that's +12 from Teixeira against +8 from Casey and -1 from Quinlan: that's still a difference of only five runs.
(I know I'm ignoring defense here, but as Kotch and Tex are both Gold Glove contenders, I think that's going to be a wash.)
Now, let's look at some other issues: Teixeira is far pricier than Kotchman. Teixeira is three years older than Kotchman. Teixeira is a free agent afterthis year 2008, and is considered to be a favorite to bolt for the east coast, from which he hails (a Maryland native, he played college ball at Georgia Tech). Teixeira is represented by Scott Boras, who says stupid crap about Tex being worth $30M per year.
And, oh yeah: this isn't even a straight-up deal, we'd also be asked to give up one of Ervin Santana and Joe Saunders! A team that just lost Bartolo Colon forever and has Santana -- who led the team in wins last year! -- down in AAA to work out his kinks. A team that only has four major league starters at the moment, and if it traded Saunders, might only have three (four once Santana straightens out). How the hell does this seem like a good idea to anybody? We're going to give up one of our few remaining starters and three years of Casey Kotchman to get five extra runs out of Mark Teixeira?! COME ON!
(Now, I know we'd also have Tex next season before he bolted. And maybe Kendry Morales would be ready to step in for him if we didn't re-sign him. I'm just not sure that the difference between Casey and Teixeira next year would be worth the cost, especially given that we'd be down one of our five planned 2008 starting pitchers.)
It doesn't matter, the Braves are gonna top our offer, anyway. I'll be glad to get that monster out of our division.
Though there is an outside chance they could acquire Chicago White Sox outfielder Jermaine Dye, it appears to be Mark Teixeira or bust for the Angels ...Okay, seriously, what is this nonsense?
...
Angels first baseman Casey Kotchman would be part of any package to acquire Teixeira, and the Rangers, who had zeroed in on Ervin Santana before the struggling right-hander was demoted to triple-A Salt Lake on July 18, are believed to be comfortable with left-hander Joe Saunders as part of a deal.
But the Rangers want a third player and are scouring the Angels' farm system to determine who to ask for. If Texas wants one of the Angels' elite prospects, such as third baseman Brandon Wood or double-A pitcher Nick Adenhart, trade talks would fizzle. But if Texas would accept a lesser prospect, a deal would be more likely.
The Rangers are also believed to be interested in outfielders Reggie Willits, Nathan Haynes or Terry Evans as the third player in the deal.
Now, first of all, Mark Teixeira is an excellent hitter and superb defender. He almost certainly is an upgrade on Casey Kotchman right now (if for no other reason than he's not a platoon player). But how much would he help this team over the balance of the season?
Over his career (four-and-a-half seasons), I estimate Teixeira to be roughly +.035 runs per plate appearance better than the average hitter. The Angels currently use a platoon; in their careers, Kotch is +.005 for his career against RHP and Q is +.037 against LHP.
Now, this isn't entirely fair to Casey, as it includes his disease-plagued 2006 numbers, but, for the moment, let's assume that this represents his true talent level. There are 57 games from August 1 forward, and I think we can safely assume four plate appearances per game. That's 228 plate appearances left to go in the season from the first base spot. With 229 plate appearances, at his career levels, Mark Teixeira would give us around +8 runs above average.
That's right: a whole eight runs.
76% of the Angels' PA this year have come against right-handed pitching, so of the 228 remaining PA at 1B, 173 would go to Kotchman and 55 to Quinlan (Q could of course rack up some appearances at other positions). Based on their career rates, that would give us +1 run from Kotchman and +2 runs from Robb. So three total -- five less than Teixeira: half of a win.
Now, we're almost certainly underselling Kotchman here, possibly overselling Quinlan, and possibly underselling Big Tex. Kotch so far this year is +.045 vs. RHP, Q this year is -.006, and Teixeira overall is +.053. Over 228 PA, that's +12 from Teixeira against +8 from Casey and -1 from Quinlan: that's still a difference of only five runs.
(I know I'm ignoring defense here, but as Kotch and Tex are both Gold Glove contenders, I think that's going to be a wash.)
Now, let's look at some other issues: Teixeira is far pricier than Kotchman. Teixeira is three years older than Kotchman. Teixeira is a free agent after
And, oh yeah: this isn't even a straight-up deal, we'd also be asked to give up one of Ervin Santana and Joe Saunders! A team that just lost Bartolo Colon forever and has Santana -- who led the team in wins last year! -- down in AAA to work out his kinks. A team that only has four major league starters at the moment, and if it traded Saunders, might only have three (four once Santana straightens out). How the hell does this seem like a good idea to anybody? We're going to give up one of our few remaining starters and three years of Casey Kotchman to get five extra runs out of Mark Teixeira?! COME ON!
(Now, I know we'd also have Tex next season before he bolted. And maybe Kendry Morales would be ready to step in for him if we didn't re-sign him. I'm just not sure that the difference between Casey and Teixeira next year would be worth the cost, especially given that we'd be down one of our five planned 2008 starting pitchers.)
It doesn't matter, the Braves are gonna top our offer, anyway. I'll be glad to get that monster out of our division.
Labels: Bill Stoneman, Casey Kotchman, Ervin Santana, Joe Saunders, Mark Teixeira, Robb Quinlan, Scott Boras
Tuesday, June 19, 2007
LOOKING FORWARD
As the midpoint of the season draws near, rumors begin to swirl about what, if anything, the Angels will and should do to secure their lead in the West.
However, the most imminent and likely rumor has to do with dispatching someone; the Yankees, as has been reported all over the Halosphere, have expressed interest in Shea Hillenbrand. It's hard to argue that the Angels really need Shea at this point (or that they ever did, really), but, nonetheless, we are reportedly uneasy with trading him while Garret Anderson resides on the DL and Casey Kotchman's near future is uncertain due to his concussion.
Signing Hillenbrand was a panic move in light of Juan Rivera's injury, of course. An understandable panic move, but one that was likely unnecessary (as I argued before the season). Given that he is being out-produced by both Reggie Willits and Robb Quinlan, I hold to this position.
Still, I understand wanting to make sure Casey is okay before moving forward. But I have no reservations with moving him. Kendry Morales is a better use of the roster spot.
In addition to ridding ourselves of Hillenbrand, there is talk of the Angels going out to get Adam Dunn. This is far more complicated.
Dunn certainly is an intriguing player. He has a ton of power and draws a lot of walks, two things our offense could use. But he's also a poor defender and, most likely, an ordinary baserunner (at best), and he strikes out a lot. However, being in the AL would allow him to DH, removing the poor defense from consideration, and you can live with the strikeouts when he produces like he can (a career OPS+ of 128, 134 so far this season). Dunn is an elite hitter who has never played in late summer games of particular significance, so he might really shine in a spotlight.
But, even outside of pondering what we'd have to give up (Joe Saunders and Hainley Staitia and someone else, perhaps?), he would create something of a logjam once Garret and Rivera return from injury. Rivera is about to start taking batting practice, and if he can return, even at his career 115-OPS+ level, he still would help the team considerably at bat, and with his solid defense and outstanding arm would provide a great service by relieving our corner outfielders. Dunn might be able to give Vlad a break as a DH twice a month or something, but that's far from ideal.
Reggie Willits has proven he belongs in the lineup; the Angels aren't going to bench a healthy Garret Anderson (though assuming health from him may be a case of counting chickens before they hatch) and Juan Rivera has earned playing time, as well. Though I wouldn't be adverse to acquiring Dunn if the price were right, I don't see Stoneman making such a move that could disrupt our current "offensive continuity" until he knows more about the condition of Garret and Juan.
Now, if from a month from now, neither one of those guys is healthy enough to produce, then we can revisit it. But as of this moment, I don't see anything developing on that front, and that doesn't really bother me.
I'm actually far more concerned about our bullpen, which we can discuss later this week.
However, the most imminent and likely rumor has to do with dispatching someone; the Yankees, as has been reported all over the Halosphere, have expressed interest in Shea Hillenbrand. It's hard to argue that the Angels really need Shea at this point (or that they ever did, really), but, nonetheless, we are reportedly uneasy with trading him while Garret Anderson resides on the DL and Casey Kotchman's near future is uncertain due to his concussion.
Signing Hillenbrand was a panic move in light of Juan Rivera's injury, of course. An understandable panic move, but one that was likely unnecessary (as I argued before the season). Given that he is being out-produced by both Reggie Willits and Robb Quinlan, I hold to this position.
Still, I understand wanting to make sure Casey is okay before moving forward. But I have no reservations with moving him. Kendry Morales is a better use of the roster spot.
In addition to ridding ourselves of Hillenbrand, there is talk of the Angels going out to get Adam Dunn. This is far more complicated.
Dunn certainly is an intriguing player. He has a ton of power and draws a lot of walks, two things our offense could use. But he's also a poor defender and, most likely, an ordinary baserunner (at best), and he strikes out a lot. However, being in the AL would allow him to DH, removing the poor defense from consideration, and you can live with the strikeouts when he produces like he can (a career OPS+ of 128, 134 so far this season). Dunn is an elite hitter who has never played in late summer games of particular significance, so he might really shine in a spotlight.
But, even outside of pondering what we'd have to give up (Joe Saunders and Hainley Staitia and someone else, perhaps?), he would create something of a logjam once Garret and Rivera return from injury. Rivera is about to start taking batting practice, and if he can return, even at his career 115-OPS+ level, he still would help the team considerably at bat, and with his solid defense and outstanding arm would provide a great service by relieving our corner outfielders. Dunn might be able to give Vlad a break as a DH twice a month or something, but that's far from ideal.
Reggie Willits has proven he belongs in the lineup; the Angels aren't going to bench a healthy Garret Anderson (though assuming health from him may be a case of counting chickens before they hatch) and Juan Rivera has earned playing time, as well. Though I wouldn't be adverse to acquiring Dunn if the price were right, I don't see Stoneman making such a move that could disrupt our current "offensive continuity" until he knows more about the condition of Garret and Juan.
Now, if from a month from now, neither one of those guys is healthy enough to produce, then we can revisit it. But as of this moment, I don't see anything developing on that front, and that doesn't really bother me.
I'm actually far more concerned about our bullpen, which we can discuss later this week.
Labels: a real bummer, Bill Stoneman, Casey Kotchman, Garret Anderson, Juan Rivera, Reggie Willits, Robb Quinlan, trade rumors
Thursday, May 10, 2007
THE TROUBLE WITH KOTCH
After the shocking events of last night, in which two Angels not named Vlad hit home runs, it may seem churlish to start examining someone's troubles -- especially given that it's someone who lashed a nice double last night. But Kotch was relied on to provide some offense this year, and has only occasionally provided same.
First, let's note that Kotch's line isn't that terrible. His AVG/OBP/SLG 233/304/388 adds up to an OPS+ of 92, which tied for ninth out of the fourteen AL regular first basemen. His defense probably nudges him up a bit, but he has outperformed a few stars (or semi-stars) thus far.
What's more, if he can get that average up to .300 while maintaining everything else, he'd have a line of 300/371/455, which would be an OPS+ of 129, which would be great. Even getting up to .280 would put him at 280/351/435, and an OPS+ of 118, which in the recent history of the Angels would be almost Gehrigesque.
So, right now, it's the singles that aren't getting through. Is there reason to believe that they will?
Here is some batted ball data for Casey's 2007, available from Baseball-Reference.com's Play Index:
1. Casey hits a lot of balls on the ground: 45%, far more than he hits anywhere else. And that's 45% of plate appearances, that comes out to 56% of balls in play.
2. Casey does not get hits when he hits the ball on the ground, hitting only .170.
3. Casey has essentially no power to the left side of the field, only scrapping out a "line drive to 3B" for a double there thus far.
4. Casey pulls the ball 50% of the time. He only goes up the middle 14% of the time; as you see, he (as pretty much every batter would) has a lot of success going up the middle. (There is a bit of a scoring bias here, though, as a shortstop ranging up the middle to make the play will be recorded as a ground ball to the left side here.) Again, that's per plate appearance; it's 53% of all balls in play.
Now, let's compare this to Casey's one extended period of success, the 2005 season:
Some observations here:
1. Casey was just as ineffectual, generally speaking, on groundballs in 2005 as he has been this season.
2. Casey was just as effective, generally speaking, on line drives in 2005 as he has been this season.
3. Casey was much better at going up the middle in 2005.
4. Casey got much more value out of his flyballs in 2005.
It's those last two things that are making the difference, I think.
Kotch did phenomenally on balls in the air in 2005. Six of the nine balls he hit to right field in 2005 went over the fence! That's just not sustainable.
But ... he is doing very well this year in his limited flies to right. Three hits out of seven flies (one of which was a sac fly), three of which have gone for extra bases ... I've long bemoaned Casey's top-hand tendencies, rolling over the ball in the manner of Darin Erstad and doling out 4-3 putouts. And here we see that when he puts the ball in the air to right, he gets good results!
I'd like to see Casey drive the ball more and become less pull-conscious. (Of course, I can't say he's intentionally trying to pull the ball, it often seems that he's fooled and out on his front foot, his weight coming forward too quickly on some of his grounders.) He's also done very well on his flyballs to center in these two seasons. His double last night, where he stayed back and drove a vicious liner to right-center, was a great start. I think he's capable of doing these things, and knows how, and he should eventually start doing it consistently.
And if he doesn't, well, maybe I'll join the chorus calling for Mickey Hatcher's head.
***
Now, I should probably add a sample size caveat here. We don't have a lot of plate appearances to go off here, and I don't know that anyone has ever looked at this sort of thing in a rigorous manner. I'm just looking for patterns. The fact that the numbers seem to back up what I see with my eyes ... it's a nice coincidence. It will be interesting to check back in on this stuff at the end of the year.
First, let's note that Kotch's line isn't that terrible. His AVG/OBP/SLG 233/304/388 adds up to an OPS+ of 92, which tied for ninth out of the fourteen AL regular first basemen. His defense probably nudges him up a bit, but he has outperformed a few stars (or semi-stars) thus far.
What's more, if he can get that average up to .300 while maintaining everything else, he'd have a line of 300/371/455, which would be an OPS+ of 129, which would be great. Even getting up to .280 would put him at 280/351/435, and an OPS+ of 118, which in the recent history of the Angels would be almost Gehrigesque.
So, right now, it's the singles that aren't getting through. Is there reason to believe that they will?
Here is some batted ball data for Casey's 2007, available from Baseball-Reference.com's Play Index:
Type Tot % Out 1B 2B 3B HR SF AVG SLGSome breakdowns:
GB Right 36 31 31 4 0 1 0 0 .139 .194
GB Middle 4 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 .500 .500
GB Left 13 11 11 2 0 0 0 0 .154 .154
LD Right 7 6 2 2 3 0 0 0 .714 1.143
LD Middle 3 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 .333 .333
LD Left 3 3 0 2 1 0 0 0 1.000 1.333
FB Right 7 6 3 0 2 0 1 1 .500 1.143
FB Middle 7 6 5 0 0 1 1 0 .400 1.000
FB Left 13 11 12 1 0 0 0 0 .077 .077
FB Catcher 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 .000 .000
SO 10 9 10 0 0 0 0 0 .000 .000
BB+HBP 11 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 ---- ----
TOTAL 115 80 14 6 2 2 1 .233 .388
% AVG SLGWhat conclusions can we draw?
GB: 45 .170 .208
LD: 13 .692 1.000
FB: 24 .222 .593
Rt: 43 .265 .469
Mi: 9 .357 .714
Lt: 25 .207 .241
1. Casey hits a lot of balls on the ground: 45%, far more than he hits anywhere else. And that's 45% of plate appearances, that comes out to 56% of balls in play.
2. Casey does not get hits when he hits the ball on the ground, hitting only .170.
3. Casey has essentially no power to the left side of the field, only scrapping out a "line drive to 3B" for a double there thus far.
4. Casey pulls the ball 50% of the time. He only goes up the middle 14% of the time; as you see, he (as pretty much every batter would) has a lot of success going up the middle. (There is a bit of a scoring bias here, though, as a shortstop ranging up the middle to make the play will be recorded as a ground ball to the left side here.) Again, that's per plate appearance; it's 53% of all balls in play.
Now, let's compare this to Casey's one extended period of success, the 2005 season:
Type Tot % Out 1B 2B 3B HR SF AVG SLG(Just in case you look this up, I didn't include Casey's two sacrifice attempts, one of which was a successful sacrifice and one of which was a hit.)
GB Right 34 24 32 2 0 0 0 0 .059 .059
GB Middle 13 9 8 5 0 0 0 0 .385 .385
GB Left 12 9 11 1 0 0 0 0 .083 .083
LD Right 8 6 3 4 1 0 0 0 .625 .750
LD Middle 7 5 0 7 0 0 0 0 1.000 1.000
LD Left 4 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 .750 .750
FB Right 9 6 2 0 0 0 6 1 .750 3.000
FB Middle 11 8 8 0 2 0 1 0 .273 .727
FB Left 10 7 8 0 2 0 0 0 .200 .400
FB Catcher 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ---- ----
SO 18 13 18 0 0 0 0 0 .000 .000
BB+HBP 15 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 ---- ----
TOTAL 141 91 22 5 0 7 1 .272 .492
% AVG SLG
GB: 42 .136 .136
LD: 14 .789 .842
FB: 21 .379 1.241
Rt: 36 .260 .520
Mi: 22 .484 .645
Lt: 19 .231 .462
Some observations here:
1. Casey was just as ineffectual, generally speaking, on groundballs in 2005 as he has been this season.
2. Casey was just as effective, generally speaking, on line drives in 2005 as he has been this season.
3. Casey was much better at going up the middle in 2005.
4. Casey got much more value out of his flyballs in 2005.
It's those last two things that are making the difference, I think.
Kotch did phenomenally on balls in the air in 2005. Six of the nine balls he hit to right field in 2005 went over the fence! That's just not sustainable.
But ... he is doing very well this year in his limited flies to right. Three hits out of seven flies (one of which was a sac fly), three of which have gone for extra bases ... I've long bemoaned Casey's top-hand tendencies, rolling over the ball in the manner of Darin Erstad and doling out 4-3 putouts. And here we see that when he puts the ball in the air to right, he gets good results!
I'd like to see Casey drive the ball more and become less pull-conscious. (Of course, I can't say he's intentionally trying to pull the ball, it often seems that he's fooled and out on his front foot, his weight coming forward too quickly on some of his grounders.) He's also done very well on his flyballs to center in these two seasons. His double last night, where he stayed back and drove a vicious liner to right-center, was a great start. I think he's capable of doing these things, and knows how, and he should eventually start doing it consistently.
And if he doesn't, well, maybe I'll join the chorus calling for Mickey Hatcher's head.
***
Now, I should probably add a sample size caveat here. We don't have a lot of plate appearances to go off here, and I don't know that anyone has ever looked at this sort of thing in a rigorous manner. I'm just looking for patterns. The fact that the numbers seem to back up what I see with my eyes ... it's a nice coincidence. It will be interesting to check back in on this stuff at the end of the year.
Labels: 4-3, Casey Kotchman
Friday, May 04, 2007
DESCENT
After two fine games in Kansas City, the wheels came off a bit in the last two days. Ervin Santana finally pitched a good game on the road; I was very impressed with his mixture of pitches, both in terms of pitch selection and location. He moved the ball in and out very well and kept out of predictable patterns. Sadly, one fastball too many strayed over the middle of the plate, and he lost the game. It happens.
Most impressive in his outing was that he issued only one walk. He did give up 11 hits, more than you'd like to see, but as we know that's the sort of thing that evens out over time; when you challenge batters to earn their way on base, sometimes they do, but more often they don't. The fact that he was pounding the strike zone was good to see; in his previous losses this year, he had walked 13 batters in 14 innings, which is simply unacceptable.
Jered Weaver still hasn't had an ideal start, by his standards, but let it be known that the first two runs he allowed yesterday were both by baserunners who should never have been on base in the first place. Gary Matthews Jr.'s elliptical paths to flying baseballs sometimes cost us and sometimes don't, and yesterday cost us big when his incompetence led to a Ross Gload triple. Reggie Willits mis-read a ball in the fourth that led to a lead-off double. With a pitcher like Weaver on the mound, the outfield has to be on their game, and they weren't here. Still, his peripheral numbers -- 9 strikeouts against 2 unintentional walks and 7 hits in six innings -- were solid, and in the long run he'll be fine.
The real problem the last two games, as it has been and will be again, was the offense. Players not named Vladimir Guerrero went 3-for-30 yesterday with one walk and no extra-base hits; the day before, they were 6-for-28 with one walk and three doubles. That adds up to a 155/183/207 line for Non-Vlads over the two games, and we're simply not going to win when that happens. And as currently constituted, this is an offense incapable of scoring runs in a hurry; Matthews is the only semi-legitimate power threat in the lineup outside of Vlad (unless you want to count Shea Hillenbrand, who has one extra-base hit in 87 AB this year, or the struggling Mike Napoli), which means the singles have to string together to make the runs happen. Casey Kotchman's season has been fits and starts so far, but hopefully he can step up behind Vlad and make some run production ensue.
Most impressive in his outing was that he issued only one walk. He did give up 11 hits, more than you'd like to see, but as we know that's the sort of thing that evens out over time; when you challenge batters to earn their way on base, sometimes they do, but more often they don't. The fact that he was pounding the strike zone was good to see; in his previous losses this year, he had walked 13 batters in 14 innings, which is simply unacceptable.
Jered Weaver still hasn't had an ideal start, by his standards, but let it be known that the first two runs he allowed yesterday were both by baserunners who should never have been on base in the first place. Gary Matthews Jr.'s elliptical paths to flying baseballs sometimes cost us and sometimes don't, and yesterday cost us big when his incompetence led to a Ross Gload triple. Reggie Willits mis-read a ball in the fourth that led to a lead-off double. With a pitcher like Weaver on the mound, the outfield has to be on their game, and they weren't here. Still, his peripheral numbers -- 9 strikeouts against 2 unintentional walks and 7 hits in six innings -- were solid, and in the long run he'll be fine.
The real problem the last two games, as it has been and will be again, was the offense. Players not named Vladimir Guerrero went 3-for-30 yesterday with one walk and no extra-base hits; the day before, they were 6-for-28 with one walk and three doubles. That adds up to a 155/183/207 line for Non-Vlads over the two games, and we're simply not going to win when that happens. And as currently constituted, this is an offense incapable of scoring runs in a hurry; Matthews is the only semi-legitimate power threat in the lineup outside of Vlad (unless you want to count Shea Hillenbrand, who has one extra-base hit in 87 AB this year, or the struggling Mike Napoli), which means the singles have to string together to make the runs happen. Casey Kotchman's season has been fits and starts so far, but hopefully he can step up behind Vlad and make some run production ensue.
Labels: Casey Kotchman, Ervin Santana, Gary Matthew Jr (scenic routes to the ball of), Gary Matthews Jr, Jered Weaver, Mike Napoli, Reggie Willits, Shea Hillenbrand, Vladimir Guerrero
Monday, April 16, 2007
THE OUTAGE
While our starting rotation is plagued by injury right now, the true cause of our recent malaise is substandard offense. We have only scored seven runs in our last four games, and are averaging a measly 3.42 runs per game over the season's first two weeks.
Though I hoped and believed that our offense would surpass last year's effort, mostly thanks to contributions from Casey Kotchman and Howie Kendrick (both of whom have delivered in the early going), I'm sure we all did realize that such run shortages would be in the cards. The fundamental problem of the offense remains unchanged: the lineup is built around one man, Vladimir Guerrero, and a lineup that leans so heavily on any one man will struggle to find consistency.
Vlad has managed to deliver this season, but thus far is the only bopper in our lineup. He has driven in 12 runs, twice as many as Maicer Izturis, who ranks second on the team in that category. Those 12 ribbies account for a shocking 29% of Angel runs in the early going. (And nothing against Ztu, but if he ends up the season second on the team in steaks, we're in some trouble.)
This is unsustainable, and won't be sustained; last year Vlad's RBIs accounted for roughly 15% of Halo scoring.
Vlad is hitting a mighty 429/526/643 with runners in scoring position this year; that is also likely to abate, though he's a good bet to hit around .325 in such situations. But even that outstanding level of production means that Vlad would only be converting one scoring opportunity in three, so he clearly needs assistance in picking up the slack.
Unfortunately, no one is doing that so far. The team, as a whole, is hitting 206/270/255 with runners in scoring position -- and this includes Vlad's outrageously good performance . Garret Anderson, who actually has one more plate appearance than Vlad in RISP situations (20 to 19 -- partially thanks to Vlad's being on base in 37% of his PA), is only 1-for-20 with 1 RBI in those situations. That's a lot of runner stranded, a lot of scoring opportunities wasted. Orlando Cabrera ranks third on the team with 14 plate appearances with RISP; he is 2-for-14 with 3 RBI.
Again, this will not continue. This is not a great offense, but they're not a bunch of .200 hitters, either. Garret Anderson is hitting .050 with RISP. That's just a fluke.
What is less of a fluke is the scarcity of run-scoring chances. The Angels have had 115 plate appearances this season with RISP, with a total of 170 runners on in those appearances. That's 9.6 such PA per game, and 14.17 runners per game (note that runners stranded for subsequent batters are double-counted). The Boston Red Sox, who have bashed us around for two days in Fenway, have 12 PA with RISP per game, with 20 runners per game.
And why don't we get runners into scoring position? Because we don't get runners on base, of course. I guess the fact that our .323 OBP ranks 7th in the AL thus far isn't terrible, but it's not too exciting, either, especially on the heels of a 10th-place finish in that category last season (our SLG thus far ranks an even worse 11th). And the runners we put on in front of the big gun, Vladi, aren't particularly good at reaching base.
Gary Matthews Jr.'s OBP thus far is .314; yes, it is obviously early and that means nothing in terms of evaluating him, but his performance last season marked only the second time in his career that he was able to sustain an OBP above the park-adjusted league average over a full season. Orlando Cabrera is actually off to a good start, but it's worth noting that last season was the first time he registered an OBP better than the park-adjusted league average, and even then he only did so by two points.
I worry that this is going to hurt us in the long run. If Matthews can't reprise last year's magic and The OC can't sustain his new-found on-base ability, RBI opportunities for Vlad (and Garret) won't mount up, and we already know we'll be lucky to convert one-third of the ones that do.
Is there a solution? My guess is that Kotch, Howie, and Ztu are all better candidates to set Vlad's table than Matthews and Cabrera are. But none of those guys are proven in such a role, so we are unlikely to see them get a shot there unless Matthews and Cabrera tank.
Our current #1 and #2 have shown, over their careers, that they can step up and create run-scoring opportunities. But they have also shown that they are unlikely to, and if that's the sad destiny they fulfill, and our younger players demonstrate such an aptitude, I hope our management will be willing to re-think the lineup and give Vlad and Garret some runners to actually clean up.
While our starting rotation is plagued by injury right now, the true cause of our recent malaise is substandard offense. We have only scored seven runs in our last four games, and are averaging a measly 3.42 runs per game over the season's first two weeks.
Though I hoped and believed that our offense would surpass last year's effort, mostly thanks to contributions from Casey Kotchman and Howie Kendrick (both of whom have delivered in the early going), I'm sure we all did realize that such run shortages would be in the cards. The fundamental problem of the offense remains unchanged: the lineup is built around one man, Vladimir Guerrero, and a lineup that leans so heavily on any one man will struggle to find consistency.
Vlad has managed to deliver this season, but thus far is the only bopper in our lineup. He has driven in 12 runs, twice as many as Maicer Izturis, who ranks second on the team in that category. Those 12 ribbies account for a shocking 29% of Angel runs in the early going. (And nothing against Ztu, but if he ends up the season second on the team in steaks, we're in some trouble.)
This is unsustainable, and won't be sustained; last year Vlad's RBIs accounted for roughly 15% of Halo scoring.
Vlad is hitting a mighty 429/526/643 with runners in scoring position this year; that is also likely to abate, though he's a good bet to hit around .325 in such situations. But even that outstanding level of production means that Vlad would only be converting one scoring opportunity in three, so he clearly needs assistance in picking up the slack.
Unfortunately, no one is doing that so far. The team, as a whole, is hitting 206/270/255 with runners in scoring position -- and this includes Vlad's outrageously good performance . Garret Anderson, who actually has one more plate appearance than Vlad in RISP situations (20 to 19 -- partially thanks to Vlad's being on base in 37% of his PA), is only 1-for-20 with 1 RBI in those situations. That's a lot of runner stranded, a lot of scoring opportunities wasted. Orlando Cabrera ranks third on the team with 14 plate appearances with RISP; he is 2-for-14 with 3 RBI.
Again, this will not continue. This is not a great offense, but they're not a bunch of .200 hitters, either. Garret Anderson is hitting .050 with RISP. That's just a fluke.
What is less of a fluke is the scarcity of run-scoring chances. The Angels have had 115 plate appearances this season with RISP, with a total of 170 runners on in those appearances. That's 9.6 such PA per game, and 14.17 runners per game (note that runners stranded for subsequent batters are double-counted). The Boston Red Sox, who have bashed us around for two days in Fenway, have 12 PA with RISP per game, with 20 runners per game.
And why don't we get runners into scoring position? Because we don't get runners on base, of course. I guess the fact that our .323 OBP ranks 7th in the AL thus far isn't terrible, but it's not too exciting, either, especially on the heels of a 10th-place finish in that category last season (our SLG thus far ranks an even worse 11th). And the runners we put on in front of the big gun, Vladi, aren't particularly good at reaching base.
Gary Matthews Jr.'s OBP thus far is .314; yes, it is obviously early and that means nothing in terms of evaluating him, but his performance last season marked only the second time in his career that he was able to sustain an OBP above the park-adjusted league average over a full season. Orlando Cabrera is actually off to a good start, but it's worth noting that last season was the first time he registered an OBP better than the park-adjusted league average, and even then he only did so by two points.
I worry that this is going to hurt us in the long run. If Matthews can't reprise last year's magic and The OC can't sustain his new-found on-base ability, RBI opportunities for Vlad (and Garret) won't mount up, and we already know we'll be lucky to convert one-third of the ones that do.
Is there a solution? My guess is that Kotch, Howie, and Ztu are all better candidates to set Vlad's table than Matthews and Cabrera are. But none of those guys are proven in such a role, so we are unlikely to see them get a shot there unless Matthews and Cabrera tank.
Our current #1 and #2 have shown, over their careers, that they can step up and create run-scoring opportunities. But they have also shown that they are unlikely to, and if that's the sad destiny they fulfill, and our younger players demonstrate such an aptitude, I hope our management will be willing to re-think the lineup and give Vlad and Garret some runners to actually clean up.
Labels: Casey Kotchman, Garret Anderson, Gary Matthews Jr, hacktastic offense, Howie Kendrick, Maicer Izturis, offensive woes, Orlando Cabrera, Vladimir Guerrero
Tuesday, April 03, 2007
THE GAME PLAN
Well, aside from John Lackey having a relatively short outing, Opening Day went pretty much according to plan. A strong enough outing from the starter, a few runs scrapped out here and there, and the bullpen closing the door in the last third of the game.
A few notes:
John Lackey did not look particularly good, with errant control of his fastball and slurve. He reverted back to the old pussy-footing around when he got behind in the count, getting cute with slurves (which weren't close enough to the strike zone to get anyone to bite) and foregoing his heat. Now, when Mark Teixeira is up with a runner in scoring position with two outs, fine, pitch around the guy. With guys on first and second and two outs? I'd prefer you not to walk the bases loaded, thanks.
And not only does this cowardice lead to baserunners, it also racks up the pitch count, which is going to keep Lackey from going deep into games, especially this early in the season.
Darren Oliver came in to face to left-handed batters and, shockingly, retired neither of them.
Oliver, over his career, hasn't had any kind of platoon advantage against the LHB (he's allowed an 810 OPS to RHB and 817 to LHB, a virtual tie). He's even had several seasons where lefties tag him even more than righties did, so he's miscast in a role where he's asked to only retire left-handers.
Are we so phobic of Casey Kotchman's "speed" leading to double plays that we're gonna hit-and-run with Shea Hillenbrand on base all the time? Okay, one of the instances last night was on a 3-2 count, so I dig that one. But late in the game a straight hit-and-run was put on early in the count; Casey flailed at a pitch at least a foot out of the strike zone to the side and at least a foot out of the strike zone toward the ground, and Hillenbrand got hosed from you to me. This was when Mike Wood was pitching; he couldn't find the plate at all there, and Kotchman drew a walk. The hit-and-run backfired there. Hillenbrand is no kind of speedster, so we should be careful about using this weapon.
It isn't the sort of thing you notice, but K-Rod exhibited some very nice pitching against Brad Wilkerson in the ninth. After falling behind 3-0, K-Rod came back with two fastballs to full the count. Instead of pulling a Lackey and getting cute with the breaking stuff, K-Rod kept coming at him with the fastball, garnering a flyout to deepest center.
While a fly to the warning track may look bad -- just a few feet another way and it's a home run! -- it was in fact the residue of design. With a three-run lead, Frankie knew that a home run wasn't going to hurt him, but that there's no point in walking a guy. If someone's going to reach base, make him earn it, don't give him a free pass. The K spotted his fastball perfectly on the outside corner, letting Wilkerson lay some wood on it in a place where he was unlikely to pull it over the rightfield fence or push it over the one in left. K-Rod let the ballpark work for him, and got one of the easier saves he should expect to see.
Well, aside from John Lackey having a relatively short outing, Opening Day went pretty much according to plan. A strong enough outing from the starter, a few runs scrapped out here and there, and the bullpen closing the door in the last third of the game.
A few notes:
And not only does this cowardice lead to baserunners, it also racks up the pitch count, which is going to keep Lackey from going deep into games, especially this early in the season.
Oliver, over his career, hasn't had any kind of platoon advantage against the LHB (he's allowed an 810 OPS to RHB and 817 to LHB, a virtual tie). He's even had several seasons where lefties tag him even more than righties did, so he's miscast in a role where he's asked to only retire left-handers.
While a fly to the warning track may look bad -- just a few feet another way and it's a home run! -- it was in fact the residue of design. With a three-run lead, Frankie knew that a home run wasn't going to hurt him, but that there's no point in walking a guy. If someone's going to reach base, make him earn it, don't give him a free pass. The K spotted his fastball perfectly on the outside corner, letting Wilkerson lay some wood on it in a place where he was unlikely to pull it over the rightfield fence or push it over the one in left. K-Rod let the ballpark work for him, and got one of the easier saves he should expect to see.
Labels: Casey Kotchman, Darren Oliver, Francisco Rodriguez, John Lackey, John Lackey (cowardice of), Shea Hillenbrand
Tuesday, January 30, 2007
BUNTING
As you know, the Angels under Mike Scioscia have become known for playing a brand of "small ball"; often low on sluggers, the club has had to maximize the output of its baserunners in order to score runs and win games -- or, at least, that's how the theory goes.
One aspect of this is a willingness to employ the sacrifice bunt. Since Scioscia took over the club in 2000, the team has ranked (progressively) sixth, fourth, first, fourth, second, fourth, and eighth in the American League in successful sacrifice hits.
I thought I'd take a look at our bunts from last season, to see if they helped or harmed the team's offense. Though it seems odd to look at the year in which the Angels bunted the least frequently under Scioscia, it is the most recent season, which, to me, anyway, is of the most interest.
You can find links to boxscores and play-by-play for every game that contained an Angel sacrifice hit here, thanks to the wondrous and magnificent Baseball-Reference Play Index. The Angels sacrificed successfully in 26 games, and ended up going 20-6 in those games.
Let's take a closer look. But before we do, let me clarify: the data I am examining will not allow us to determine whether or not we were hurt by all bunts called, we're just looking to see if the bunts executed correctly ended up backfiring on the offense.
What's the background here?
After years of support from everyone in baseball, in the late 1970s and early 1980s the sacrifice bunt came under assault from some within baseball (most notably Earl Weaver) and sabermetric authors such as Bill James and Pete Palmer.
Anti-bunt theory holds that your twenty-seven outs are sacred, and should only be given away in extreme circumstances. Further, giving away outs was considered likely to decrease the chances of a team scoring in that inning. Empirical studies bore this out; in The Hidden Game of Baseball, Palmer and John Thorn printed a run expectancy matrix (an updated one can be found here, with some from the past here) that showed that teams bunting a runner from first to second were giving up runs; in the case of the updated matrix, with a runner on first and no outs an average team would score .953 runs (i.e., a team in this situation 1,000 times would score 953 runs), but only score .725 with a runner on second with one out. Just about the only time permissible to bunt, according to such theories, would be in late innings of close games where one run is of paramount importance. The notion that a successful sacrifice bunt actually harmed the bunting team became a key belief of sabermetric dogma.
In an essay called "Rolling in the Grass" in his indispensable (and underrated) Guide to Managers, Bill James questions many of these assumptions (assumptions he had once trumpeted). For one, the run expectancy matrix was based on average hitters against average pitchers; for another, other things (errors, beating out hits) can happen when you bunt which are advantageous to the batting team, and the possibility of these must also be accounted for.
In The Book, Mitchel Lichtman -- at great length (the chapter runs 51 pages, and is the longest in the book) -- further explored the question of when bunting should and should not happen, exploring factors from the positioning of the defense to the groundball propensity of the batter. Lichtman's work really re-opens the question of how the bunt works; the former sabermetric knee-jerk against it seems, to me, at least, overly simplistic.
Given all these factors, how can we determine if any specific bunt is a good play or not?
Well, it's hard. And probably impossible. But we can make a best guess.
The Book employs another toy, a Win Expectancy chart, this a baby of the Tango Tiger. It basically takes a situation -- say, the home team is up in the bottom of the fifth, down by two runs with a guy on first and one out -- and tells you the chances of that team winning -- in this case, a winning percentage of .304. Hitting a home run raises it to .570. (You can, courtesy of Studes, download a spreadsheet to calculate this kinda stuff here.)
Of course, the Win Expectancy chart is also based on average hitters being up all the time, which isn't always the case.
But there are ways to deal with that, too.
Is this about to get technical?
Yeah, a bit. But I'll put a big ***** where the technical stuff ends in case you want to skip that and get to the good stuff.
I am a nerd, and cannot wait to read this part. Please do not disappoint me.
Okay.
It probably helps for you to download that spreadsheet to play along.
First of all, you'll see that it wants you to enter a run-scoring environment. What I did for this was take the park-adjusted league-average ERA for each park from BB-Ref (it was 4.38 for the Big A last year) and add .50 for unearned runs.
This doesn't really make a huge difference; in a 4.5 environment, bunting a guy from first to second in a 3-3 game in the bottom of the ninth "loses" you .009 wins; make that a 4.75 environment, and it's .010. 5.25? .013.
So even if I got an environment wrong, it's going to be within a few thousandths of where it should be, which I can personally live with.
The rest of the spreadsheet is pretty self-explanatory; I just plugged in each situation and recorded the change in WinEx.
The next step was to adjust for the quality of the batter. I posed the question of how to do this to Tango on his blog and got a spectacular response, which you can read there.
Basically, I figured out how many runs per plate appearance (using a basic linear weights, park-adjusted) each of our bunting batters was in 2006 compared to the league average. Divide that by 10 to get an estimate of wins above average, then multiply that by the Leverage Index for the situation ... say you have a batter up in that 4.5 environment situation, the 3-3 score, blah blah blah. The WinEx going in is .711. The batter is bad, -.005 runs per plate appearance. The LI is 3.1, so he decreased that by .016, so the WinEx is now .695. A successful sacrifice will raise it to .702, so, if he can bunt, well, that successful sacrifice helps the team.
After doing that, it became obvious to me that I should have accounted for how specific batters do against righty and lefty pitchers, as well as look at more than one season (where available) for each batter in order to best gauge his true talent level.
So I took the last four seasons (or, up to, for players who haven't been in the majors that long) of each of the bunting batters and broke them down into vs. RHP and vs. LHP, essentially creating profiles for two batters where there had been only one. From that point on, everything was the same as described above. (Honestly, I probably should have tried to regress some of that stuff, too, but we're dealing with such fractions that I don't know if anything would have turned out very differently.)
Really, you could keep going, accounting for the quality of pitcher, the opposing defense, groundball tendencies of batter and pitcher, etc. But at a certain point you're creating work and not really making huge strides in being right. I think the level of adjustment I've put in should be enough to give us a general view of the situation.
*****
How many times did the Angels sacrifice in 2006?
31, though two of those came from starting pitchers in interleague play. Though under normal circumstances deciding whether or not your pitcher should bunt is a strategic consideration, in the case of interleague play, I think it's just a manager protecting his pitcher. "Go out, bunt, come home safely." So I don't count those two in any of the analysis I'm doing.
What kind of situations did we bunt in?
Broken down:
Man on first, no one out: 14 times
Men on first and second, no one out: 6 times
Man on second, no out: 7 times
Men on first and third, one out: 1 time
Man on third, one out: 1 time
All told, for the 29 bunts, there were 36 men on base, and 22 eventually scored.
Is that good?
Well, I don't know.
You know the Run Expectancy Matrix I linked above? That can be further broken down. This chart tells us that, from 1999 through 2002, if a team had a guy on first base with no one out, that team would score one run .176 of the time. That doesn't necessarily mean that it's the guy currently on first who scores that run (if that guy gets thrown out stealing, then the next guy hits a home run, that's still a run for the purposes of the chart), but I think that should be close enough for us to make some guesses; if anything, that will mean our estimate of how many runs should have scored may be a bit high.
We had that situation and sacrificed 14 times last season; 11 of those times, the guy sacrificed to second scored. From 1999 through 2002, we would expect one run (or more) to score .437 of the time (if two runs score, that first run has to score first). In 14 situations, that would be 6 runs, so we're five runs ahead.
Going through each situation:
Man on first, no one out: 14 times x .437 = 6.118 runs
Men on first and second, no one out: 6 times x .641 = 3.846 runs
Man on second, no out: 7 times x .632 = 4.424 runs
Men on first and third, one out: 1 time x .655 = .655 runs
Man on third, one out: 1 time x .661 = .661 runs
That's a total of 15.704 runs we would have been expected to score with average hitters up in these situations; as we (as we'll soon see) generally bunted with below-average hitters, we would expect to score less.
In fact, we scored more often, getting 22 runs home. This indicates to me that Mike Scioscia was choosing his spots well, and probably got some luck on his side.
However, there was a lot of guesstimation on this, so don't take that as the God's Truth. It's a scarcely-educated guess, nothing more.
We can also look at the total number of runs expected to score each inning vs. how many we scored in innings with a sacrifice bunt. Here are the relevant situations from The Book:
Who was asked to bunt, and against whom?
Orlando Cabrera: 3 (1 against RHP, 2 against LHP)
Darin Erstad: 1 (against RHP)
Legs Figgins: 5 (3 against RHP, 2 against LHP)
Maicer Izturis: 5 (2 against RHP, 3 against LHP)
Adam Kennedy: 3 (1 against RHP, 2 against LHP)
Casey Kotchman: 2 (1 against RHP, 1 against LHP)
Jose Molina: 7 (5 against RHP, 2 against LHP)
Tommy Murphy: 1 (against RHP)
Reggie Willits: 2 (against RHP)
What about all that win expectancy stuff you made me read/scroll past?
Without adjusting for the quality of the batter, the successful sacrifices by the Angels cost the team a whopping .224 wins.
That's nothing; that's two runs a season. If I adjust for the quality of the batter, that goes up from -.224 to -.094. Once I account for the handedness of the pitcher, which is as far as I went, that went up to -.080.
This is, of course, pretty negligible, and given the levels of estimation required at every step here, is tantamount to saying "These sacrifices did not cost the Angels at all," in my opinion.
In fact, it appears that Mike Scioscia had a pretty good grasp over who should bunt, and when.
Or, at least, I think so. I haven't looked at other managers; maybe they all come out better under such analysis. It's certainly possible that every team is close to zero in this regard, and given the low number of sacrifice hits in the modern game, that would be my default assumption.
Here is each batter listed by how many wins his bunts gained/lost for the team:
Orlando Cabrera: -.005 (+.005 vs. RHP, -.010 vs. LHP)
Darin Erstad: -.021 (vs. RHP)
Legs Figgins: -.077 (-.045 vs. RHP, -.032 vs. LHP)
Maicer Izturis: +.007 (-.028 vs. RHP, +.035 vs. LHP)
Adam Kennedy: -.017 (-.014 vs. RHP, -.003 vs. LHP)
Casey Kotchman: +.009 (.000 vs. RHP, +.009 vs. LHP)
Jose Molina: +.018 (.049 vs. RHP, -.031 vs. LHP)
Tommy Murphy: +.027 (vs. RHP)
Reggie Willits: -.021 (vs. RHP)
What does the win expectancy chart say were the wisest bunts executed?
Jose Molina vs. Chris Ray, man on 2nd, no outs, and a 2-2 score in the bottom of the ninth: under normal circumstances, the WinEx going into this situation would be .817, with a .835 with the guy on third and one out. Molina is not a good batter against RHP, however, lowering the going-in WinEx to .798. The Fast Molina's successful bunt raised the win expectancy .037; the Orioles proceeded to walk the bases loaded, and Orlando Cabrera popped out and Vlad grounded out to end the inning.
The Angels won in the bottom of the tenth when Adam Kennedy, with runners on first and second, hit a three-run home run (more on this later).
Tommy Murphy vs. Miguel Batista, Tim Salmon on 3rd, one out, we lead 1-0 in the top of the second: a squeeze bunt was a great call here, as Murphy proved to struggle against RHP all year.
Maicer Izturis vs. Tim Byrdak, 1st-and-3rd, one out, we're up 5-2 in the top of the eighth: not only a squeeze, but Maicer ended up reaching on a fielder's choice, raising the WinEx from .947 to .973.
Jose Molina vs. Huston Street, man on 1st, no outs, we're up 4-2 in the top of the ninth: Jose got his man over; the insurance run didn't score, but with Jose vs. a top RHP, it was a good move, increasing our chances from .910 to .928 (the starting point would have been .932 with an average batter at the plate).
Jose Molina vs. J.J. Putz, man on 1st, no outs, tied 2-2 in the bottom of the ninth: sensing a theme here? Jose got his man (Reggie Willits) over to second, and Legs Figgins promptly knocked him in to win the game.
Of the 29 bunts, 12 had results that were neutral or better, and another 6 were within .010 of neutral, which for me would still sit in the "too close to call" camp.
What were the worst bunts?
I'm not going to go through them individually, but each of the worst five:
came with a man on first with no out;
and with a tie score.
Four of the five came in the ninth inning or later, and the one that didn't came in the seventh.
Also, four of the five instances led to the runner scoring, and the Angels taking the lead.
I'm actually not convinced that the WinEx models get extra innings right (or perhaps I was mistaken to use the ninth-inning values for extra innings); it is also possible that teams are wrong to play for one run as often as they do in such situations.
You're only talking about successful bunts here. What about unsuccessful ones, or ones that turn into hits?
A good question; unfortunately, the data is such that there is no easy way to ferret out such circumstances.
And, to clarify: yes, I just praised a question that I wrote to myself.
Remember that Adam Kennedy home run I said I'd come back to? Here is that game. Check out the bottom of the tenth:
That's the first thing; the second thing is ... look at Adam Kennedy: his plate appearance took two pitches. This is what they were:
Also, I don't know how many situations happened such as in this game:
What's more, look at Tommy Murphy, right before Adam comes up: guy on first, no outs, lays down a bunt late in a tie game ... and gets a hit! A situation just like the one we just finished looking at with Reggie Willits.
The fact is, you can't really evaluate whether a bunt was a good or bad call without examining every possible outcome, or at least reasonably possible outcome.
What I wanted to look at here was a narrow question: did the sacrifice bunts we got down hurt us? The probabilities say: "If so, it was ever so slightly." The results say: "The Angels actually seemed to do better in innings in which they successfully sacrificed than they would have otherwise."
What have we learned from this?
I have learned that, with the right combination of batter, pitcher, and situation, a sacrifice bunt can be a valuable weapon. If you have a hitter like Jose Molina, who is not fast, a double play threat, a poor hitter against right-handers, but is a more than competent bunter, a sacrifice will often be a good call in certain situations. If you have an overmatched left-handed hitter, like Adam Kennedy vs. a top southpaw, a sacrifice will often be a good call.
Mike Scioscia may get a bit cute with such calls from time to time (he asked Mike Napoli to squeeze last year, for God's sake), but he appears to have a pretty good grasp of when a bunt does and does not help the team. Hopefully this will continue, as our offense looks as punchless as ever, and we'll need as much help as we can to score runs and compete in a tough division.
As you know, the Angels under Mike Scioscia have become known for playing a brand of "small ball"; often low on sluggers, the club has had to maximize the output of its baserunners in order to score runs and win games -- or, at least, that's how the theory goes.
One aspect of this is a willingness to employ the sacrifice bunt. Since Scioscia took over the club in 2000, the team has ranked (progressively) sixth, fourth, first, fourth, second, fourth, and eighth in the American League in successful sacrifice hits.
I thought I'd take a look at our bunts from last season, to see if they helped or harmed the team's offense. Though it seems odd to look at the year in which the Angels bunted the least frequently under Scioscia, it is the most recent season, which, to me, anyway, is of the most interest.
You can find links to boxscores and play-by-play for every game that contained an Angel sacrifice hit here, thanks to the wondrous and magnificent Baseball-Reference Play Index. The Angels sacrificed successfully in 26 games, and ended up going 20-6 in those games.
Let's take a closer look. But before we do, let me clarify: the data I am examining will not allow us to determine whether or not we were hurt by all bunts called, we're just looking to see if the bunts executed correctly ended up backfiring on the offense.
What's the background here?
After years of support from everyone in baseball, in the late 1970s and early 1980s the sacrifice bunt came under assault from some within baseball (most notably Earl Weaver) and sabermetric authors such as Bill James and Pete Palmer.
Anti-bunt theory holds that your twenty-seven outs are sacred, and should only be given away in extreme circumstances. Further, giving away outs was considered likely to decrease the chances of a team scoring in that inning. Empirical studies bore this out; in The Hidden Game of Baseball, Palmer and John Thorn printed a run expectancy matrix (an updated one can be found here, with some from the past here) that showed that teams bunting a runner from first to second were giving up runs; in the case of the updated matrix, with a runner on first and no outs an average team would score .953 runs (i.e., a team in this situation 1,000 times would score 953 runs), but only score .725 with a runner on second with one out. Just about the only time permissible to bunt, according to such theories, would be in late innings of close games where one run is of paramount importance. The notion that a successful sacrifice bunt actually harmed the bunting team became a key belief of sabermetric dogma.
In an essay called "Rolling in the Grass" in his indispensable (and underrated) Guide to Managers, Bill James questions many of these assumptions (assumptions he had once trumpeted). For one, the run expectancy matrix was based on average hitters against average pitchers; for another, other things (errors, beating out hits) can happen when you bunt which are advantageous to the batting team, and the possibility of these must also be accounted for.
In The Book, Mitchel Lichtman -- at great length (the chapter runs 51 pages, and is the longest in the book) -- further explored the question of when bunting should and should not happen, exploring factors from the positioning of the defense to the groundball propensity of the batter. Lichtman's work really re-opens the question of how the bunt works; the former sabermetric knee-jerk against it seems, to me, at least, overly simplistic.
Given all these factors, how can we determine if any specific bunt is a good play or not?
Well, it's hard. And probably impossible. But we can make a best guess.
The Book employs another toy, a Win Expectancy chart, this a baby of the Tango Tiger. It basically takes a situation -- say, the home team is up in the bottom of the fifth, down by two runs with a guy on first and one out -- and tells you the chances of that team winning -- in this case, a winning percentage of .304. Hitting a home run raises it to .570. (You can, courtesy of Studes, download a spreadsheet to calculate this kinda stuff here.)
Of course, the Win Expectancy chart is also based on average hitters being up all the time, which isn't always the case.
But there are ways to deal with that, too.
Is this about to get technical?
Yeah, a bit. But I'll put a big ***** where the technical stuff ends in case you want to skip that and get to the good stuff.
I am a nerd, and cannot wait to read this part. Please do not disappoint me.
Okay.
It probably helps for you to download that spreadsheet to play along.
First of all, you'll see that it wants you to enter a run-scoring environment. What I did for this was take the park-adjusted league-average ERA for each park from BB-Ref (it was 4.38 for the Big A last year) and add .50 for unearned runs.
This doesn't really make a huge difference; in a 4.5 environment, bunting a guy from first to second in a 3-3 game in the bottom of the ninth "loses" you .009 wins; make that a 4.75 environment, and it's .010. 5.25? .013.
So even if I got an environment wrong, it's going to be within a few thousandths of where it should be, which I can personally live with.
The rest of the spreadsheet is pretty self-explanatory; I just plugged in each situation and recorded the change in WinEx.
The next step was to adjust for the quality of the batter. I posed the question of how to do this to Tango on his blog and got a spectacular response, which you can read there.
Basically, I figured out how many runs per plate appearance (using a basic linear weights, park-adjusted) each of our bunting batters was in 2006 compared to the league average. Divide that by 10 to get an estimate of wins above average, then multiply that by the Leverage Index for the situation ... say you have a batter up in that 4.5 environment situation, the 3-3 score, blah blah blah. The WinEx going in is .711. The batter is bad, -.005 runs per plate appearance. The LI is 3.1, so he decreased that by .016, so the WinEx is now .695. A successful sacrifice will raise it to .702, so, if he can bunt, well, that successful sacrifice helps the team.
After doing that, it became obvious to me that I should have accounted for how specific batters do against righty and lefty pitchers, as well as look at more than one season (where available) for each batter in order to best gauge his true talent level.
So I took the last four seasons (or, up to, for players who haven't been in the majors that long) of each of the bunting batters and broke them down into vs. RHP and vs. LHP, essentially creating profiles for two batters where there had been only one. From that point on, everything was the same as described above. (Honestly, I probably should have tried to regress some of that stuff, too, but we're dealing with such fractions that I don't know if anything would have turned out very differently.)
Really, you could keep going, accounting for the quality of pitcher, the opposing defense, groundball tendencies of batter and pitcher, etc. But at a certain point you're creating work and not really making huge strides in being right. I think the level of adjustment I've put in should be enough to give us a general view of the situation.
*****
How many times did the Angels sacrifice in 2006?
31, though two of those came from starting pitchers in interleague play. Though under normal circumstances deciding whether or not your pitcher should bunt is a strategic consideration, in the case of interleague play, I think it's just a manager protecting his pitcher. "Go out, bunt, come home safely." So I don't count those two in any of the analysis I'm doing.
What kind of situations did we bunt in?
Broken down:
All told, for the 29 bunts, there were 36 men on base, and 22 eventually scored.
Is that good?
Well, I don't know.
You know the Run Expectancy Matrix I linked above? That can be further broken down. This chart tells us that, from 1999 through 2002, if a team had a guy on first base with no one out, that team would score one run .176 of the time. That doesn't necessarily mean that it's the guy currently on first who scores that run (if that guy gets thrown out stealing, then the next guy hits a home run, that's still a run for the purposes of the chart), but I think that should be close enough for us to make some guesses; if anything, that will mean our estimate of how many runs should have scored may be a bit high.
We had that situation and sacrificed 14 times last season; 11 of those times, the guy sacrificed to second scored. From 1999 through 2002, we would expect one run (or more) to score .437 of the time (if two runs score, that first run has to score first). In 14 situations, that would be 6 runs, so we're five runs ahead.
Going through each situation:
That's a total of 15.704 runs we would have been expected to score with average hitters up in these situations; as we (as we'll soon see) generally bunted with below-average hitters, we would expect to score less.
In fact, we scored more often, getting 22 runs home. This indicates to me that Mike Scioscia was choosing his spots well, and probably got some luck on his side.
However, there was a lot of guesstimation on this, so don't take that as the God's Truth. It's a scarcely-educated guess, nothing more.
We can also look at the total number of runs expected to score each inning vs. how many we scored in innings with a sacrifice bunt. Here are the relevant situations from The Book:
1--, 0: .950Going through math above, we find that the Angels, in innings where they sacrificed, "would" have scored 33.402 runs (again, this is with average hitters against average pitchers). As it turned out, the Halos scored 40 runs in such innings, hinting once again that Scioscia called bunts (1) wisely and/or (2) and benefited from luck.
12-, 0: 1.585
-2-, 0: 1.192
1-3, 1: 1.249
--3, 1: .999
Who was asked to bunt, and against whom?
What about all that win expectancy stuff you made me read/scroll past?
Without adjusting for the quality of the batter, the successful sacrifices by the Angels cost the team a whopping .224 wins.
That's nothing; that's two runs a season. If I adjust for the quality of the batter, that goes up from -.224 to -.094. Once I account for the handedness of the pitcher, which is as far as I went, that went up to -.080.
This is, of course, pretty negligible, and given the levels of estimation required at every step here, is tantamount to saying "These sacrifices did not cost the Angels at all," in my opinion.
In fact, it appears that Mike Scioscia had a pretty good grasp over who should bunt, and when.
Or, at least, I think so. I haven't looked at other managers; maybe they all come out better under such analysis. It's certainly possible that every team is close to zero in this regard, and given the low number of sacrifice hits in the modern game, that would be my default assumption.
Here is each batter listed by how many wins his bunts gained/lost for the team:
What does the win expectancy chart say were the wisest bunts executed?
The Angels won in the bottom of the tenth when Adam Kennedy, with runners on first and second, hit a three-run home run (more on this later).
Of the 29 bunts, 12 had results that were neutral or better, and another 6 were within .010 of neutral, which for me would still sit in the "too close to call" camp.
What were the worst bunts?
I'm not going to go through them individually, but each of the worst five:
Four of the five came in the ninth inning or later, and the one that didn't came in the seventh.
Also, four of the five instances led to the runner scoring, and the Angels taking the lead.
I'm actually not convinced that the WinEx models get extra innings right (or perhaps I was mistaken to use the ninth-inning values for extra innings); it is also possible that teams are wrong to play for one run as often as they do in such situations.
You're only talking about successful bunts here. What about unsuccessful ones, or ones that turn into hits?
A good question; unfortunately, the data is such that there is no easy way to ferret out such circumstances.
And, to clarify: yes, I just praised a question that I wrote to myself.
Remember that Adam Kennedy home run I said I'd come back to? Here is that game. Check out the bottom of the tenth:
Bottom of the 10th, Angels Batting, Tied 2-2, Julio Manon facing 5-6-7Two things pop out here; one, Willits had a bunt single. This was certainly a case where, had Willits been thrown out, he would have been credited with a sacrifice. Instead, he beat it out for a hit. Mike Scioscia, in calling for this bunt, obviously knew Willits, a speedy runner, had a chance to beat it out (or reach via an error), so if you wanted to go through and assign Scioscia some kind of score for the bunts he called, this would be a credit. The result of the play added .104 in win expectancy (which in itself is greater than the -.080 brought to us by our sacrifices); had it been a sacrifice, it actually would have been a slight loss (-.011, before adjustments).
Sit Pit Batter Result
--- 4 G Anderson Single to CF
1-- 2 R Willits Single to 1B/Bunt; Anderson to 2B
12- 2 A Kennedy Home Run (RF); Anderson Scores; Willits Scores
That's the first thing; the second thing is ... look at Adam Kennedy: his plate appearance took two pitches. This is what they were:
1. Foul BuntSo here's a situation where Scioscia called for the bunt, Adam didn't get it down, and he took off the bunt. Adam went deep. How would we credit that? I don't know.
2. Ball in Play
Also, I don't know how many situations happened such as in this game:
Bottom of the 7th, Angels Batting, Behind 3-4, Roy Halladay facing 7-8-9Remember that groundout by Adam? It was a bunt, and Adam took exception to what he was thought was a poor jump by Chone Figgins from second, and all hell broke loose in the locker room after the game. I remember that because I remember things like this, but I don't remember every instance, and the gamelog doesn't even record the fact that it was a bunt.
Sit Pit Batter Result
--- 2 M Napoli Home Run (CF)
--- 1 R Quinlan Single to RF
Chone Figgins pinch runs for Robb Quinlan batting 8th
1-- 1 T Murphy Single to SS/Bunt; Figgins to 2B
12- 1 A Kennedy Groundout: P-3B/Forceout at 3B; Murphy to 2B
What's more, look at Tommy Murphy, right before Adam comes up: guy on first, no outs, lays down a bunt late in a tie game ... and gets a hit! A situation just like the one we just finished looking at with Reggie Willits.
The fact is, you can't really evaluate whether a bunt was a good or bad call without examining every possible outcome, or at least reasonably possible outcome.
What I wanted to look at here was a narrow question: did the sacrifice bunts we got down hurt us? The probabilities say: "If so, it was ever so slightly." The results say: "The Angels actually seemed to do better in innings in which they successfully sacrificed than they would have otherwise."
What have we learned from this?
I have learned that, with the right combination of batter, pitcher, and situation, a sacrifice bunt can be a valuable weapon. If you have a hitter like Jose Molina, who is not fast, a double play threat, a poor hitter against right-handers, but is a more than competent bunter, a sacrifice will often be a good call in certain situations. If you have an overmatched left-handed hitter, like Adam Kennedy vs. a top southpaw, a sacrifice will often be a good call.
Mike Scioscia may get a bit cute with such calls from time to time (he asked Mike Napoli to squeeze last year, for God's sake), but he appears to have a pretty good grasp of when a bunt does and does not help the team. Hopefully this will continue, as our offense looks as punchless as ever, and we'll need as much help as we can to score runs and compete in a tough division.
Labels: Adam Kennedy, bunting, Casey Kotchman, Darin Erstad, Jose Molina, Legs Figgins, Mike Scioscia, Orlando Cabrera, Reggie Willits, Tommy Murphy, win expectancy
Tuesday, November 14, 2006
WE ARE IDIOTS, POSSIBLY
It is alleged that the Angels have offered Alfonso Soriano a six-year deal worth $80M.
Mike DiGiovanna, in the above-linked report, also says:
Soriano, for all his physical gifts, is a poor defensive second baseman; there is every reason to believe that Kendrick could make a good defensive first baseman with enough time, but why waste his talents there? He's already shown good athleticism at the keystone, and his bat will be much more valuable in the middle of the infield than on a corner. And such a move -- wrapping up Soriano for six years -- also negates the existence of Casey Kotchman and Kendry Morales, most likely putting Kotchman on the trading block (when his value, coming off his debilitating sickness, will be at its lowest) and consigning Morales, who showed some good leather around the bag last year, to DH work if he sticks around.
Not to mention that this plan doesn't address center field or third base. The only real way pursuing Soriano makes sense is if he is envisioned as either a center or left fielder. He took fairly well to left field last year, and with his speed and arm might even hold his own in center. If not, he can always play the corner, with Garret being the primary DH and Reggie Willits being the late-inning defensive caddy for Juan Rivera in center.
That's not the best-sounding defense in the world, but at least there's some pop in the bats, and Reggie Willits to salve some wounds.
I also wonder if Soriano would really go for a six-year deal in lieu of a five-year that is worth more dollars per year. I'm not convinced he's actually worth the ~$13M we may have offered, but I think perceptions of his ability are such that he can pull down more than Aramis Ramirez's $15M per.
I'm beginning to worry a bit about what this team has up its sleeve. After thankfully losing out on the ill-advised pursuit of Paul Konerko last winter, it almost seems like Bill Stoneman wants to do something for the sake of saying he did. But tossing money at old players who would block our cheaper (and soon to be better) players ... that ain't any kind of plan. So hopefully it isn't ours.
It is alleged that the Angels have offered Alfonso Soriano a six-year deal worth $80M.
Mike DiGiovanna, in the above-linked report, also says:
Though the Angels appear set at Soriano's two primary positions, left field (Garret Anderson) and second base (Howie Kendrick), they could move Kendrick to first base, Anderson to designated hitter or open up center field for Soriano.Seitz is all over the, shall we say, suboptimal nature of this, but on parsing the language it sounds much more like speculation than an actual plan.
Soriano, for all his physical gifts, is a poor defensive second baseman; there is every reason to believe that Kendrick could make a good defensive first baseman with enough time, but why waste his talents there? He's already shown good athleticism at the keystone, and his bat will be much more valuable in the middle of the infield than on a corner. And such a move -- wrapping up Soriano for six years -- also negates the existence of Casey Kotchman and Kendry Morales, most likely putting Kotchman on the trading block (when his value, coming off his debilitating sickness, will be at its lowest) and consigning Morales, who showed some good leather around the bag last year, to DH work if he sticks around.
Not to mention that this plan doesn't address center field or third base. The only real way pursuing Soriano makes sense is if he is envisioned as either a center or left fielder. He took fairly well to left field last year, and with his speed and arm might even hold his own in center. If not, he can always play the corner, with Garret being the primary DH and Reggie Willits being the late-inning defensive caddy for Juan Rivera in center.
That's not the best-sounding defense in the world, but at least there's some pop in the bats, and Reggie Willits to salve some wounds.
I also wonder if Soriano would really go for a six-year deal in lieu of a five-year that is worth more dollars per year. I'm not convinced he's actually worth the ~$13M we may have offered, but I think perceptions of his ability are such that he can pull down more than Aramis Ramirez's $15M per.
I'm beginning to worry a bit about what this team has up its sleeve. After thankfully losing out on the ill-advised pursuit of Paul Konerko last winter, it almost seems like Bill Stoneman wants to do something for the sake of saying he did. But tossing money at old players who would block our cheaper (and soon to be better) players ... that ain't any kind of plan. So hopefully it isn't ours.
Labels: Alfonso Soriano, Aramis Ramirez, Bill Stoneman, Casey Kotchman, hysteria, Kendry Morales, Paul Konerko, Reggie Willits
